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Chapter 6
The Origins of Economic Orthodoxy in Mexico1
María Eugenia Romero Sotelo
_______________________________________
1. Introduction
This article supports the hypothesis that the formation of an an 
economically orthodox current in Mexico was a conscious act by a 
sector of Mexico’s élite, intended to create an alternative to what has 
been called economic nationalism, which emerged with the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910 and was consolidated by the economic and social 
reforms promoted by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940)2
                                                          
1 A Spanish version of this article has been published in the Journal 
Economía UNAM, vol. 8. No.24, 2011.
. In the 
2 This article is the result of my research visit to the Instituto de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos (IELAT) at the Universidad de Alcalá, as part of the 
Short-Stay Post-Doctoral Research Programme organised by Fundación 
Carolina and the Department of Academic Staff at the Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (UNAM). My gratitude to all three institutions. I 
would like to extend particular thanks to: Pedro Pérez Herrero, Director of 
IELAT, for his commitment to my research programme; to my colleagues 
and friends Leonor Ludlow, Carlos Tello, Enrique Rajchenberg, Juan Pablo 
Arroyo, Emilio Caballero and Rogelio Huerta, for the time and effort they 
were willing to put in to reading this article, and for their intelligent and 
thought-provoking comments; and to Samuel Luna Millán, for his support 
in carrying out this research. Finally, I would like to mention that this work 
is part of a line of research developed by the project PAPIIT IN307408 
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word of the researchers: the Revolutionary movement set Mexico on 
the road toward the economic doctrine that would prevail in Western 
economies in the post-War period, and it was during Cárdenas’s ad-
ministration that the biggest steps were taken3
In December of 1934, General Lázaro Cárdenas was sworn in 
as President of the Republic, and he undertook a series of wide-
ranging structural reforms intended to resolve social problems and
encourage growth and economic development in Mexico. Within this 
programme, the State played the pivotal role as promoter of devel-
opment. The plan was a turning point in Mexican economic thought, 
as it broke with the liberal-style economic policy that had been dom-
inant in Mexico since the Revolution in 1910, even during periods 
such as the crisis of 1929. From that moment on, two different ways 
of approaching and resolving the problems of the Mexican economy 
would remain in tension with one another for the rest of the twentieth 
century.
.
The Cardenist economic policy of growth with distribution of 
wealth was not looked favourably upon by a particular class of busi-
ness owners. The State played a very active role in the economy in 
its quest for independent, nationalistic economic development, and 
all of this implied: a renewed impetus for agrarian reform (a wide-
reaching redistribution of land), and consequently the redistribution 
of the nation’s wealth; and support for workers’ interests through the 
formation of trade unions and respect for the right to strike. The poli-
cy encouraged economic activity via a broad programme of public 
investment, which in turn was responsible for the construction of 
large public infrastructure projects. To this end, a group of public in-
stitutions was created to manage and guide the economy, including 
the development bank Nacional Financiera and the agricultural lend-
ing institution Banco de Crédito Ejidal. In 1938, Cárdenas national-
                                                                                                                           
“Philosophy, Figures and Institutions in Mexican Economic Policy, 1880-
2005”. 
3 See Loyola & Martínez, 2010, p. 27.
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ised the oil industry and created the state-owned oil company 
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)4
The economic philosophy that emerged from this era consti-
tutes the basis of Mexican “developmentalism”, characterised by 
State intervention to ensure high growth rates, the distribution of 
revenues and job creation
.
5
This policy upset economic interests and gave rise to the de-
liberate construction of an alternative to Cárdenas’s approach, con-
sisting of the reconstitution of the liberal movement that had domi-
nated the country’s economy from the end of the nineteenth century 
to the end of the nineteen-thirties. Throughout the time that 
‘developmentalist’ thought was being formed and evolving, orthodox
economic thinking was also present, and it laid down tenets at the 
same time that it was establishing institutions within the country. 
This eventually created the conditions for neo-liberalism to come to
the fore in the nineteen-eighties. This paper will attempt to answer 
the following questions: How did orthodox economic thinking come 
. The approach was most closely identi-
fied, at that time, with Eduardo Suárez, the Finance Minister under 
Presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Ávila Camacho, and this
school of thought, with varying interpretations, dominated and per-
meated Mexican economic policy for much of the twentieth century 
until the beginning of the nineteen-eighties.
                                                          
4 “From 1934, he undertook considerable structural reforms. Beginning dur-
ing his campaign, he adopted a model of economic planning, expressed in 
the First Six-Year Plan, that was inspired by Soviet planning. President 
Cárdenas also created institutions and a legal framework to sustain his eco-
nomic policy: in 1935, he established the Department of Hunting and Fish-
ing, the Forestry Department and the Department of Indigenous Affairs, fol-
lowed by the National Deposit Stores in 1936; in 1937, the National Bank 
of Foreign Trade and the National Workers’ Industrial Development Bank 
were founded, and the New Insurance Law was passed. In 1939, the Na-
tional Housing Commission was created, among other institutions.” Loyola 
& Martínez, “Guerra”, 2010, p. 23. 
5 For a full description of Mexican “developmentalism” (desarrolismo), see 
Suárez, “Dos visiones”, 2005, p. 229. For an overview of the economic the-
ories of Lázaro Cárdenas, see Guerrero, “Pensamiento”, 2005, p. 189. 
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about in Mexico? And how was orthodox thinking able to develop in 
Mexico, with Cardenist-Keynesian philosophy so dominant on the 
economic political scene?
Orthodox liberal thinking, in the opinion of Francisco Suárez, 
began to develop in the decades of the nineteen-twenties and thir-
ties6. My personal view is that this school of thought is a continua-
tion of the liberalism that prevailed during the reign of Porfirio Díaz
at the end of the nineteenth century, updated with new developments 
from the liberal school of the nineteen-twenties, in particular the 
Austrian School, put forward by Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig 
von Mises. This approach was adopted and promoted in Mexico by 
Luís Montes de Oca7
                                                          
6 For a description of Mexican orthodox thinking, see Suárez, “Dos 
visiones”, 2005, pp. 228-229.
and Miguel Palacios Macedo, who believed 
that price stability should be the foremost objective of economic pol-
icy. The intellectual talents of these two figures were complemented 
by the pragmatic approach of businessmen such as Raúl Baillères 
7 Luís Montes de Oca was Minister of Finance and Public Credit from the 
16th of February 1927 to the 20th of January 1932. He occupied the post 
during the administrations of three Presidents: for a year and two months 
under Plutarco Elías Calles; for a year and two months under Emilio Portes 
Gil; and for eleven months under Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Eduardo Villaseñor 
describes him as a classical liberal and staunch opponent of any official in-
tervention to influence the national economy. He also had strong links to 
two of the representatives of the liberal orthodox current of the moment, 
with whom he maintained a correspondence: Ludwig Von Mises and Frie-
drich Von Hayek. Aníbal de Iturbide describes him as “an extraordinarily 
cultured man, and one with good relations with other talented men”. He was 
a natural leader and his opinions held a great deal of influence in intellectual 
and business circles in the country. He created and developed an ideology 
for these groups. He was Minister of Finance in the midst of the depression 
in the nineteen-thirties, in response to which he defended a balanced budget 
and “healthy finances”. He was also Director General of the Bank of Mexi-
co, and in this position he refused to provide support for the financial defi-
cits required by Minister of Finance Eduardo Suárez to expand the economy 
during the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas. Ibid., p. 227.
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and Aníbal de Iturbide. These figures are fundamental to an under-
standing of the roots of orthodox thinking in Mexico, as well as its 
development and the consolidation of its power during the last centu-
ry.
Together, they began the task of establishing institutions that 
would counteract Cardenist principles in the economy and in politics. 
In academia, they founded higher-education institutes that provided
an alternative to the leftist ideology in state universities, specifically 
the ideology of the School of Economics of the UNAM, founded in 
1929 by a group of nationalist intellectuals.
During this process of the formation of the school of orthodox 
economic thought in Mexico, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von 
Hayek had considerable intellectual influence. Both belonged to the 
socalled Austrian School, and the two professors were firmly op-
posed to any kind of planned economy, associating freedom with the 
market. They gained their position of influence in Mexico as a result 
of the fact that they helped to reinforce the approach and the rhetoric 
of the groups of business leaders and intellectuals who rejected the 
trend of economic nationalism. The question that arises is: How did
the Austrian School and the resistance against Cardenism work to-
gether? Within the group of Mexican intellectuals, the leading role 
was played by Luís Montes de Oca. He studied the work of Mises 
and Friedrich von Hayek, established a relationship with them, and 
they encouraged his ideas from an intellectual standpoint. Raúl 
Baillères, one of the group of pragmatic business leaders, provided 
financial support for the project. Together, these individuals con-
structed and breathed political life into the school of liberalism in 
this country.
2. An Alternative to Cardenism: Von Mises and Von Hayek
The rallying point in the intellectual debate between Luís 
Montes de Oca and the two professors from the Austrian School was 
the criticism of a planned economy that entailed very active interven-
tion on the part of the State in the country’s economic affairs. This 
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was condemned by all parties from the standpoints of both theory 
and policy. In Mexico, with the economics of Cárdenas, the notion 
had been established of planning with State intervention (the Six-
Year Plan), and this gained currency in many so-called Third-World 
countries in the period following the Second World War. The opin-
ions of Montes de Oca and his familiarity with the two representa-
tives of the Austrian School are made clear in an article, “State Inter-
vention in Economic Activity”, published in the year 19438
Montes de Oca and Von Mises met in New York in the winter 
of 1941. The former then invited Mises to visit Mexico for a series of 
conferences at the Universidad de México, and offered him excellent
.
conditions if he were to extend his sojourn. In her memoires, Margit 
von Mises, wife of Ludwig, recounts:
He offered Lu a lifetime position, a house with garden, a car 
and chauffeur, and tremendously high salary if Lu would accept his 
proposition. But Lu refused. He was happy to come as a guest, but he 
remained firm in his decision to make his home in the United States9
Despite such an attractive offer, Mises declined the proposal 
of the former Finance Minister. A year later, at an encounter in Man-
hattan, Montes de Oca again invited him for a period of two months 
and they discussed the possibility of having his book Socialism trans-
lated into Spanish. This would eventually be published in Mexico in 
1961, two years after Montes de Oca’s death.
.
While war raged on the international stage, on the 11th of Jan-
uary 1942, Von Mises arrived in Mexico in the company of his wife 
Margit and remained in the country until the 25th of February of that 
year.
The couple was received by a group of university professors 
and lodged at the Ritz Hotel in Mexico City. Mrs. Mises gives a de-
scription of the reception they received at the hotel and her impres-
sions of the following weeks:
                                                          
8 Montes de Oca, 1943, pp. 225-264.
9 Von Mises, 1976, p. 75. Margit referred to her husband Ludwig Von 
Mises as “Lu”.
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Our suit… was so full of roses, gardenias, and white callas I 
thought I was back on the stage.
The subsequent seven weeks… were perhaps the greatest 
surprise of my life. Not only because Lu, for the first time 
since we had left Europe, got the recognition he deserved, but 
because the high intellectual standard of Mexican elite, 
whom we had the privilege of meeting during our stay, was 
absolutely overwhelming to me10.
A group within the Mexican élite much admired the contribu-
tions that Von Mises had made to economic theory. In Mexico the 
Viennese professor seemed to have achieved a level of recognition
that he did not yet enjoy in the United States. Mises’s wife comments 
that Montes de Oca was already familiar with Mises’s work when 
they met, as we have already mentioned. It is possible that Montes de 
Oca introduced other members of the Mexican élite to the theories of 
the Austrian School.
Mises began his series of conferences on the 14th of January, 
at the school of economics of the UNAM and at the Escuela Libre de 
Derecho. Between 8 and 14 students attended the lectures, which 
were given in English. Montes de Oca himself acted as translator.
During his stay in Mexico City, Mises would meet Montes de 
Oca at the latter’s house at night. During these gatherings, Mises ex-
pressed again and again his pessimism about the future of society. 
Montes de Oca, on the other hand, insisted on his optimism. He be-
lieved that it was not too late to fight for freedom and was firmly 
convinced that Mexico was the ideal place to start.
The Association of Mexican Bankers, which was presided 
over by Raúl Baillères, also convened two conferences that were 
given by Von Mises. The first of them was on the topic of “Banking 
and Economic Policy in Our Time”; the second was “Planning and 
                                                          
10 Ibid.
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Banking”. These conferences were held in the auditorium of the 
Confederation of Chambers of Commerce in Mexico City11
Two of the most prominent associations of Mexican business 
leaders, the Association of Mexican Bankers and the Mining Industry 
Confederation, asked Von Mises to extend his stay and offered him
employment as an economic adviser. He asked for more information 
about the duties he would be expected to perform. Six months later, 
Montes de Oca made him the following proposal:
.
According to his proposition, Mises would become the head of 
the economics departments of the two business associations, with 
sufficient personnel to assist him and at a comfortable monthly salary 
of 1,000 Mexican pesos (a lunch for one person at the Ritz costs 
three or four pesos). He would also be teaching courses and seminars 
at any department he wished at the National University of Mexico 
and at the Colegio de Mexico, and he would be free to take up other 
(paid) teaching assignments. The offer was for three years and could 
become effective any time – Mises would not even have to return to 
the United States after his upcoming visit12
Once this offer had been received, Mises became interested in 
knowing more about the situation of the Mexican economy. In a let-
ter to his friend Hayek, he describes the opinion of Mexico that he
.
formed during his trip:
Mexico is a country without industry and very short of capital. 
The soil is in the greater part of the country very poor. The re-
sult... is that they have to import wheat and mais [Mises meant 
what Americans call “corn”], but the rulers – generals, trade 
union leaders and pink intellectuals – intend to start industrial-
ization by ruthless confiscation of capital. Neither this attitude 
nor its effects differ from conditions in other countries. But re-
ally amazing is the fact that there are some people – of course 
                                                          
11 El Nacional, 16th, 20th, 21st of February 1942. The Association of 
Mexican Bankers was founded in 1928.
12 Hülsmann, 2007, pp. 813-814.
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a small elite only – who have a very keen insight into the prob-
lems involved and try to educate the intellectuals13.
Two things are immediately notable in this letter to his friend: 
first, the description that Mises makes of the Mexican economy 
(poor and without industry), combined with infertile farmland and 
the existence of an industrialisation scheme sponsored by trade-union 
leaders and intellectuals based on what he refers to as the “confisca-
tion of capital”. Secondly, Mises is intrigued and surprised to note
that there is an élite in Mexico that is opposed to the Mexican gov-
ernment’s policy and that is attempting to create an intellectual 
movement in favour of its own arguments. In this latter aspect, both 
Mises and Hayek went on to play a fundamental role.
Following this first visit, Mises and Montes de Oca maintained 
an intense and fruitful correspondence.
In the month of June 1942, Montes de Oca proposed to Mises 
the establishment of the Instituto Internacional de Ciencias Sociales, 
which would be under his direction, and in 1943 he informed Mises
that considerable progress had been made on the project. In the same 
letter, he also asked for suggestions as to what teachers might be 
willing to work for the institute, and the salaries that they would 
command:
Mises replied that Walter Sulzbach, Alfred Schütz, Louis 
Rougier, Jacques Rueff and he himself – all European expatriates liv-
ing in New York without American citizenship – would be available 
for permanent employment in Mexico City for an annual compensa-
tion of some $ 6,000 per head. This was a fairly generous salary, and 
proved to be a major stumbling block for the establishment of the In-
stitute. But in early 1943 everything seemed possible: a group of
first-rate intellectuals with classical-liberal pedigree was at least po-
tentially available and another group of men was interested in financ-
ing the venture. Moreover, there was a plan: Louis Rougier would be 
invited to the University of Mexico City for a series of lectures; 
Mises was to prepare a study on Mexican politico-economic condi-
                                                          
13 Ibid., pp. 814-815.
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tions (which Montes de Oca had commissioned for his Banco 
Internacional); and Montes de Oca continued to work on a translation 
of Socialism14
The subjects they would teach were: economics; history and 
critical analysis of the economic doctrines of the last two centuries; 
constitutional history since 1776; economic and social history since 
1750; and modern public finance.
.
Mises began to take on a role as intellectual adviser to the 
Mexican élite with Montes de Oca as his intermediary, which he 
makes reference to in his letter to Hayek. He was consulted in con-
nection with the formation and development of what was later to be-
come the movement’s most important educational project: the 
Instituto Tecnológico de México.
3. An Economic Policy for the Post-War Period: Von Mises
At the end of the month of February 1942, Mises left Mexico 
with a promise to write an article for the magazine Cuadernos Amer-
icanos15
The war did not put a stop to intellectual endeavour; on the 
contrary, many intellectuals poured their energies into reflections on 
what the respective virtues and defects were of the different political 
regimes at large in the world, and which had clashed in the Second 
World War: socialism, fascism, communism, liberalism. Among the-
se thinkers were Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Pop-
. He was true to his word, and “Ideas on Post-War Policy” 
was published in the July-August edition (number 4) of the magazine 
in that same year. In the article, Mises reflects on the economic poli-
cy guidelines that in his opinion different nations should follow to
rebuild their economies in the post-War period.
                                                          
14 Ibid., p. 827.
15 A magazine of social sciences and philosophy, founded and edited by 
Jesús Silva Herzog.
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per; Friedrich von Hayek and Mises also took part in this collective 
meditation16
In his article, Von Mises maintains that to rebuild their econ-
omies, nations should follow a policy that was radically different 
from the one used before the start of the war. He was specifically re-
ferring to economic nationalism, which he believed detrimental to 
economic development. He describes it as:
.
…An economic policy based on the belief that it is possible to 
promote the wellbeing of all the subjects of a nation, or at least 
a specific group, by putting into practice measures that are dis-
advantageous to foreigners. It was believed that a service was 
being rendered to one’s country by obstructing or completely 
prohibiting imports of foreign products, restricting foreign 
immigration or expropriating, in part or in full, the capital be-
longing to foreigners. This is not the place to undertake an in-
vestigation of whether measures such as these were in fact ide-
al for the purposes of achieving the desired outcome. Classical 
free-trade theory has now provided irrefutable proof that the 
end result of restrictions on foreign commerce is none other 
than a generalised decrease in the productivity of labour and, 
therefore, of the standard of living. Thus, production ceases in 
places where it could create large yields, and is transposed to 
other locations where, with a minimum of effort on the part of 
both capital and labour, far lower returns are obtained. The 
classical theory of free trade espoused by Hume, Smith and 
Ricardo has never been refuted. Every postulation made 
against it has subsequently proved to be unfounded17.
Mises maintained that the elimination of economic nationalism 
was a precondition for nations to achieve peace and wellbeing in the 
post-War period. He believed that the essential problem of the post-
War economy was a shortage of capital, and for him the only way to 
alleviate this ill was:
                                                          
16 Watson, 2003, pp. 405-406
17 Von Mises, 1942, p. 88.
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…to produce more than is consumed, that is, to save and 
thereby to create new capital. The more is produced, and the 
more of what is produced is invested and the less consumed, 
the faster will the difficult times of lack of capital pass. Any-
one who advises a different solution to the one that we have 
just explained is deluding himself, or is trying to delude oth-
ers18.
He goes on:
There are no magical financial procedures to ease the lack of 
capital. The expansion of credit cannot alleviate it, much less 
eliminate it. On the contrary, a boom artificially created by an 
expansion of credit may lead to a lack of focus, and therefore a 
squandering of capital, by immediately favouring overconsump-
tion, that is, the consumption of capital. Inflationary experi-
ments will do nothing but worsen the crisis. What is needed in 
this case is, precisely, a monetary and credit policy that ensures 
the stability of monetary value19.
Mises was of the opinion that governments should abandon 
their confiscatory policies and radically change their taxation poli-
cies. He proposes that:
…the part of revenue that is not consumed, but is saved and in-
vested, should be free from all taxes, since it is in the public in-
terest that as much new capital be formed as possible20.
To conclude, Von Mises’s proposal for the policy for recon-
struction following the Second World War was to bring to an end the 
economic nationalism that had entailed a policy of protectionism, as 
well as a taxation policy that, in his opinion, did not allow an in-
crease in savings and the formation of capital. Economic reconstruc-
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 93.
19 Ibid., p. 93.
20 Ibid., p. 94.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
 
131
tion, in his opinion, had to be lit by the glow of the free-trade para-
digm.
4. Von Mises and the Economic Problems of Mexico
Also resulting from his trip to Mexico was the essay Economic 
Problems in Mexico, written in 1943, in which Von Mises put for-
ward a critique of Mexican State economic policy since the Revolu-
tion of 1910. The essay was published by the Instituto Cultural Lud-
wig Von Mises in 1998, with an introduction by Carolina R. de Bolí-
var. In the year of publication, she was the Academic Director of the
Instituto Josefina Vázquez Mota and a notable member of the Partido 
Acción Nacional political party.
Bettina Bien Greaves, a distinguished student of Von Mises, 
presented the institute with the text of this publication as a gift, after 
inheriting from Ludwig and Margit von Mises all the documents that
they left behind in their New York apartment when they died. Margit 
von Mises describes the role that Greaves played in their lives as fol-
lows:
…She first came to the seminar in 1951 and attended it to the 
last session, not missing a single meeting. She is one of those 
rare individuals who combine intelligence and mental curiosity 
with warmth and understanding of human nature. With the 
passing of the years, she became a household ward with Lu 
and me. If there was any information Lu needed, any refresh-
ing of his memory, he would say, “Call Bettina” and surely 
enough she had the answer21.
After four or five years in the seminar, Bettina took her seat 
next to Lu, taking notes in shorthand – and no one would have 
dared to contest for that seat. I spoke first to Bettina in 1952 
during a seminar in California. At the time she was still rather 
quiet, hardly asking any questions, but later, working with 
                                                          
21 Von Mises, 1976, p. 140.
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tremendous zeal, studying Lu’s books from beginning to end, 
reading them again and again, her inner security grew in rela-
tion to her knowledge. She wrote an excellent bibliography of 
Lu’s work, and for his ninetieth birthday she catalogued – with 
my permission and without Lu’s knowledge – his whole li-
brary of about 6,000 volumes, to Lu’s greatest surprise and de-
light22.
Bettina Bien Greaves was very familiar with the Mises library, 
which she also inherited when the couple passed away. This explains 
her finding the documents where Mises analysed the Mexican econ-
omy, and which make up the content of Mises’s previously un-
published article on Mexico.
In “Economic Problems in Mexico”, Ludwig von Mises chal-
lenges the economic policy measures implemented by President 
Lázaro Cárdenas during his administration. His criticism centres on: 
State intervention, inflation, protectionism and economic national-
ism23
Before turning to an analysis of Mises’s arguments, it is im-
portant to note that when Mises visited Mexico, the country was un-
der the administration of President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-
1946) and the Second World War was being played out international-
ly. The war created favourable conditions for the industrialisation of 
the country, by increasing demand for Mexican manufactured goods 
on the international market. The most salient features of the industri-
alisation project then under way were: a very active role for the State 
in the economy, protectionism, the granting of tax incentives and the 
creation of infrastructures.
.
In his essay, the author takes as his starting point the argument 
that Mexico is a backward country and that industrialisation is the 
key to solving the problems of economic underdevelopment, alt-
hough he states his opposition to the industrialisation policies of the 
Mexican State, which are based on considerable State intervention 
                                                          
22 Ibidem.
23 Von Mises, 1998.
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and protectionism. With reference to the period of nationalization 
under Lázaro Cárdenas, he comments that Mexico needed capital for 
development and that these nationalisations scared it away:
What Mexico needs more than anything else is capital, either of 
its own or from overseas. The default on the national debt and 
the expropriation of foreign investments discourage the external 
capitalist, and the methods of taxation obstruct the accumulation 
of internal capital. Complete renunciation of these practices is 
the first requirement for the economic regeneration of the coun-
try.
There is no hope of building prosperous industry in a country 
that considers every businessman as exploitative and tries at 
every turn to punish his success. The policy of shortening the 
working day and driving up costs, by forcing the entrepreneur to 
provide housing for his workers and establishing minimum 
wages, either due to the direct interference of the government or 
by failing to reign in the demands of the unions, is foolhardy in 
a country whose industrial base has yet to be created.
It is an unfortunate reality that a country that has less favourable 
natural conditions for production than others, and that suffers 
from a comparative lack of capital, has just one way in which to 
compete with countries that have been more blessed by nature 
and are richer in capital: a cheaper workforce. In a world with 
no barriers to immigration, there is a tendency to put salaries in 
different countries on a par with one another. If there is no free-
dom of movement for workers, however, salaries must neces-
sarily be lower where natural resources are scarcer and capital 
less abundant. There is no way to change this fact. If the gov-
ernment or the trade unions are unwilling to accept this reality, 
not only will they fail to improve conditions for the masses, but 
they will make them worse. They will hinder the development 
of manufacturing industries, condemning workers to persist as 
agricultural labourers in extreme poverty, when they could have 
better-paid employment in factories.
The only way to improve the economic situation of Mexico is 
through economic liberalism: that is, a policy of laissez-faire...
to envy the success of one’s more fortunate countryman is a 
common weakness among men. But an honourable patriot 
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should not look upon the fortunes of efficient entrepreneurs 
with distaste. He must understand that, in a capitalist society, 
the only way to accumulate wealth is by supplying consumers 
with the goods that they demand, at the lowest possible cost. He 
who serves the public best, is best rewarded. What Mexico 
needs is economic freedom24.
In general, then, the developmental policy of the Mexican 
State was disparaged by Mises: the specific targets of his criticism 
were the protection of the internal market, wage and union policies, 
and the intervention of the State in the economy.
5. The Institutions: the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura
A group of businessmen, headed by Raúl Baillères, was inter-
ested in providing an alternative to the economic policy that had pre-
vailed in Mexico since the administration of Cárdenas25
                                                          
24 Von Mises, 1998, pp. 12-13.
. In 1946, the
institution that would become the standard-bearer for this alternative 
project was founded: the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura. Formally, 
it was created with the aim of: initiating, promoting, stimulating, 
sponsoring, or directly administering and directing educational and 
25 At a later date, both the old-guard industrialists and bankers would play a 
role in the establishment of higher-education institutions that provided an 
alternative to what they perceived as the leftist ideology prevalent in State-
regulated universities. The Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores 
de Monterrey (ITESM), founded by local industrialists in 1943, placed em-
phasis on technical fields of study, such as engineering and business admin-
istration. Inspired by the institutes of technology of Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia, the “Tec de Monterrey” would not have an economics department 
until 1954. Another private university, the Universidad Iberoamericana, was 
also founded in the nineteenforties with a conservative, Catholic ethos, and 
did not open an economy department until the nineteen-sixties. Babb, 
Proyecto, 2003, pp. 98-99. 
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cultural activities of all kinds26. Its founding statement explains that, 
in order to comply with its fundamental purpose of promoting educa-
tion in Mexico, the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura undertook to:
…establish a system of higher-education campuses that are free 
to exist with no obligations other than to the laws of learning, 
and with complete academic liberty; with no purpose other than 
the discovery of the truth and the education of young people; 
removed from any dependence on militancy or group politics;
free from the vicissitudes of financial hardship; capable of 
providing, within a strict framework of order and discipline, 
new opportunities for the youth of Mexico in efficient cultural 
education, scientific instruction, technical training and research; 
that guarantees for its faculty members an honourable life and 
their enthusiastic and exclusive dedication to teaching; and 
which encourages equally the complete education of the young 
person in aspects cultural, scientific, technical, sporting and, es-
sentially, moral and patriotic27.
Among the founders of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura 
we find seven of the country’s largest banks and several businesses 
based in Monterrey, including the brewery Compañía Cervecera
Moctezuma and the iron and steel producer Compañía Fundidora de 
Fierro y Acero de Monterrey28
The prominent individuals that took part in the formation of 
the Association include: Mario Domínguez, Luís Montes de Oca, 
Ernesto Amescua, Aarón Sáenz, Evaristo Araiza, Federico T. de
Lachica, Julio Lacaud, Manuel Senderos, Pedro Maus, José de la 
Mora, Emilio Souberville, Hipólito Signoret, Guillermo Barroso, 
Carlos Gómez y Gómez, Manuel Ulloa, Carlos Trouyet, Rogelio 
Azcárraga, Aníbal de Iturbide, Enrique González Rubio, Carlos 
Novoa, Antonio Díaz Lombardo, Salvador Ugarte, Noé Graham 
Gurría, Fernando A. González, Bernabé A. del Valle, Manuel Sand-
.
                                                          
26 Negrete, 1988, pp. 9-11.
27 El Universal, 26th May 1946, p. 10.
28 Ibid.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
136
 
oval Vallarta, Eduardo García Máynez, Antonio Martínez Báez, Fer-
nando Orozco, Gustavo R. Velasco, Mariano Alcocer and Virgilio 
Domínguez. The Association’s first board of directors was com-
prised of businessmen, bankers and individuals who had pursued ca-
reers in both the public and private sectors29
The Association’s founders considered that their most pressing 
task was to cultivate institutions that would promote technical train-
ing with a human touch among young people wishing to go into pro-
fessions in the banking, industrial and commercial sectors
.
30
a) The School of Industrial Engineering, which offered courses in 
mechanical, electrical, chemical and administrative engineering.
. For this 
reason, they chose to establish:
b) The Mexican Institute of Economics, where students could study 
bachelor’s and doctorate degrees in economics, or to become stat-
isticians or actuaries.
c) The School of Administration, which trained students to become 
accountants and business administrators in the banking, industrial 
and commercial sectors.
The Association also offered short specialisation courses for 
executives and employees in banking, industry and commerce, with 
the aim of promoting technical innovation and cultural develop-
ment31
The educational institutions that were created on the basis of 
this platform would be administered by a Technical Advisory Com-
mission made up of university academics, including: Dr. Manuel 
Sandoval Vallarta, Dr. Fernando Orozco, Virgilio Domínguez, Anto-
nio García Báez, Gustavo R. Velasco and Mariano Alcocer. Eduardo 
García Máynez was appointed Director General
.
32
The creation of the different schools was seen as, or was por-
trayed as, “...the first major step by private enterprise in favour of 
.
                                                          
29 Ibid.
30 Universal, 12th January 1947, p. 11.
31 Opción, 1988, p. 5.
32 “La Asociación Mexicana de Cultura va en auxilio de la Universidad”, El 
Nacional, 24th June 1946, p. 6.
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cultural refinement, in a spirit of cooperation with the National Uni-
versity of Mexico and with the aim of solving problems of over-
crowding in classrooms”33. This account was contested by Gilberto 
Loyo, then the Dean of the National School of Economics at the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, who claimed that his 
school in fact had a shortage of students34.
6. Creation of the Instituto Tecnológico de México
 
The Asociación Mexicana de Cultura eventually achieved its 
objective and created the Instituto Tecnológico de México (ITM), 
later known as ITAM, whose core programme was the study of eco-
nomics and which was organised as an alternative to the programme 
of studies at the UNAM’s School of Economics. In 1946, the 
Asociación Mexicana de Cultura opened its rival School of Econom-
ics, which followed the study plans and programmes that were in use 
at the National University with some minor adjustments in the order 
of the various subjects, but without eliminating any of them35
It might be considered curious that the School of Economics at 
the ITM chose to follow the curriculum and programmes of the 
School of Economics at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, if it had been created as an alternative to the latter. When 
the news broke, some people espresse doubts about the new educa-
tional institution: Why would the country’s bankers want to create
another school of economics? Would it not be better for them to pro-
vide financial support for economic culture through the institutions 
that already existed
.
36
would later on be provided by the founders themselves of the institu-
tion in question.
? The answers to these questions
                                                          
33 Ibid..
34 “Economistas”, El Tiempo, 15th March 1946, pp. 29-30.
35 El Universal, 6th January 1948, p. 7.
36 Revista de Economía Continental, vol. 1, no. 1, 15th August 1946.
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Dr. Josué Sáenz, a lecturer at the School of Economics and the 
Director of Statistics at the Ministry of the Economy, was the first 
person that the bankers asked to be Director of the Mexican Institute 
of Economics. He turned down the position. The appointment was 
then conferred on Daniel Kuri Breña, a close collaborator with the
Partido Acción Nacional and someone, therefore, perhaps much 
more ideologically aligned with the founders’ plans37
In an interview in 1988, one of the founding partners, the 
banker Aníbal de Iturbide, gave some insight on the set of circum-
stances that persuaded the group to create the Asociación Mexicana 
de Cultura and the Instituto Tecnológico de México. In his words:
.
[In 1946] at the end of the presidency of Manuel Ávila 
Camacho… there was a Cardenist ideology that was still very 
much in vogue, which was, in our opinion, misguided. The no-
tions of governance of General Cárdenas were still exerting a 
great deal of influence on the ideological development of poli-
tics and the Mexican way of life, which we believed was not 
the best way to go about seeking the balanced development of 
the nation.
So a group of us, those of us that organised the Asociación 
Mexicana de Cultura, were of the opinion that if we were to 
promote industrial development in Mexico, we would have to 
try to change the mentality of the people, because with a mind-
set that was predominantly socialist and left-leaning in nature, 
which was the most dominant ideology in politics, we did not 
believe that industrial development was possible. It was not 
possible for the existing climate to be conducive to capital in-
vestment, either Mexican or foreign, to allow Mexico to begin 
a new predominantly industrial stage in its development.
That was essentially the reason why we decided to found the 
Instituto Tecnológico de México, with the aim of creating a 
school of economics to educate the men who would in the fu-
ture administer the private and public finances of Mexico...38
                                                          
37 “Economistas”, El Tiempo, 15th March 1946, pp. 29-30.
38 Negrete, 1988, p. 9.
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According to de Iturbide’s account, the idea began to form 
during the administration of General Lázaro Cárdenas, when the 
group of businessmen in question began to realise that Cardenist pol-
icy was at odds with their way of thinking. He says:
We believed that with Cardenist ideology in full force, there 
was insufficient incentive for the large-scale capital invest-
ments that were needed to begin the process of transforming 
the country from one that relied on agriculture, fisheries and 
mining to one that was
industrialised.
We decided not to go ahead with the School of Engineering 
because we came to the conclusion that we would not be effec-
tive if we tried to include too many branches. Instead we chose 
to focus on three or four schools, with preference always for 
the School of Economics, because it was our belief that this 
would be the base on which the future of Mexico would be 
built39.
The chief proponents of the ideology of State intervention es-
poused by Cardenism, which was so criticised by Iturbide and his 
partners at the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, were the National
School of Economics at the UNAM and its academics. Many of the 
latter belonged to the economic nationalist movement, and had the 
objective of implementing the programme that was fought for during 
the Mexican Revolution, which would later evolve into a policy for 
economic development. Some of them were: Jesús Silva Herzog, one 
of the founders of the National School of Economics; Enrique Gon-
zález Aparicio, Ricardo Torres Gaytán, Horacio Flores de la Peña 
and Emilio Mugica. They were all deans of the School, held high-
level positions in the public sector, and played important roles in the 
public sphere. At the National School of Economics, these professors 
recruited students for the public sector, while simultaneously creat-
ing the professionals that the ‘developmentalist’ State needed for 
                                                          
39 Ibid. p. 10.
Globalization and Economic Crisis
140
 
administrative purposes40. According to research carried out by 
Roderic Camp:
Graduates of the National School of Economics have tended to 
concentrate heavily in two government agencies: The Secretari-
at of Industry and Commerce, and the Secretariat of the Treas-
ury. There are several reasons for this concentration. As is evi-
dent … leadership of those agencies has been dominated by pro-
fessors or graduates of the National School of Economics from 
1929 to 195141.
An interesting case is that of Gilberto Loyo:
…who became dean of the School of Economics in 1944, 
gave a great impetus to the career of being an economist by 
encouraging the employment of economists in the Secretariat 
of Industry and Commerce, which he headed in 1952 after 
leaving the deanship. Control of this agency by National 
School of Economics graduates has continued until 1974. The 
establishment of a federal Income Tax Department in the sec-
retary of the treasury, which almost exclusively employed 
economists… was soon directed consecutively by National 
Economic School graduates. Lastly, when costudents and pro-
fessors recruited students, it was often into their own agen-
cies42.
It was in opposition to this school of thought that the liberal 
project headed by the group of businessmen in question began to 
create alternative institutions. In an article published in the magazine 
Tiempo on the 15th March 1946, a quote was printed from one of the 
founders of the ITM – who was not identified, but who was part of 
the so-called BUDA group (the cabal formed by bankers Raúl 
Baillères, Salvador Ugarte, Mario Domínguez and Ernesto J. 
Amezcua) – which said: “We need liberal economists uncontaminat-
                                                          
40 Camp, 1975.
41 Ibid., p. 147.
42 Ibid.
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ed by interventionism, who defend our interests in opposition to the 
State”43
The unnamed source went on to criticise the National School 
of Economics:
.
...the National University and its School of Economics [are] in 
a permanent state of disorder, and as for the latter, which is pos-
sessed by statist ideology, it is incapable of guaranteeing the 
creation of well-educated, technical economists that may be en-
trusted with positions in banking and private enterprise without 
raising concerns44.
Gilberto Loyo, Dean of the National School of Economics at 
that time and a professor of statistics and demographics at the same 
institution, responded to this statement from a purely academic
viewpoint:
It is false to claim that at this institution we provide an ideologi-
cally doctrinaire professional education. The academic freedom 
enjoyed by teaching staff at the UNAM allows for the National 
School of Economics to be exposed to all schools of thought, 
and this is in fact the case. However, what we do aspire to is for 
graduates of our institution to be capable of serving the nation 
and not just a specific social class. We have also made sure that 
our
study plans are standardised, so that students can apply their 
know-how effectively, independently of whether or not they nu-
ance them with their own purely personal opinions45.
The statement issued by the businessmen could not be clearer 
in relation to their motives for establishing the ITM: in their opinion, 
only a liberal economic policy was capable of representing the inter-
ests of private enterprise. Despite their criticism of the administration 
                                                          
43 El Tiempo, 9th August 1946, pp. 33-34.
44 “Economistas”, El Tiempo, 15th March 1946, pp. 29-30.
45 Ibid.
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of Manuel Ávila Camacho for being under the sway of Cardenist 
ideology, they recognise that the government – and de Iturbide him-
self mentions this in the interview referred to above – never put up 
the slightest resistance to their development of the educational pro-
ject of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura.
7. Some of the Leaders of the Project
The president of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, from its 
establishment and up until his death in 1967, was Raúl Baillères, a 
banker who in 1934 founded Crédito Minero, S.A. (later Banca 
Cremi), the first Mexican bank specialising in the financing of min-
ing concerns. He later founded the financial institutions Crédito 
Hipotecario, S.A., and Crédito Afianzador, S.A.; and from 1941 to 
1942 he was the president of the Association of Mexican Bankers. In 
1941, Baillères was also the leader of a group of investors with con-
trolling stakes in the brewery Compañía Cervecera Moctezuma based 
in Monterrey, and in the chain of department stores El Palacio de 
Hierro46
Baillères pursued many of these business interests in the nine-
teen-thirties as part of the BUDA financial group, made up of him-
self, Salvador Ugarte, Mario Domínguez and Ernesto J. Amezcua; 
the four were also founders of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura 
and together they established and expanded several large business 
ventures
.
47
                                                          
46 Baillères, 1988, p. 6.
.
47 In 1932, on the initiative of Salvador Ugarte, the financial institution 
Banco de Comercio was formed (later Bancomer and now BBVA). Raúl 
Baillèr esplayed a leading role in this project, and the bank’s institutional 
organisation was entrusted to Aníbal de Iturbide. Collaborators on this pro-
ject included Mario Domínguez, Ernesto Amezcua and Liberto Senderos. A 
short time later, they would go on to establish Crédito Hipotecario, S.A. and 
Crédito Afianzador, S.A. together. They would also play a part in the crea-
tion of Banco General de Capitalización, founded in 1934. In 1956, disa-
greements over the control of Banco de Comercio caused the departure of 
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Raúl Baillères, the project leader, was opposed to the govern-
ment’s statist strategy, which in his opinion had seized control of a 
large number of companies and had thereby limited the scope of ac-
tion for private enterprise:
He was intuitively convinced that the system could not work 
and that Mexico needed a free society with private enterprise as 
its engine of economic development48
 
. 
Aníbal de Iturbide introduced Raúl Baillères to Luís Montes 
de Oca, and of this encounter he says:
I was the one who brought them together. Luís was the ideas 
man, and Raúl the one who provided financial support49.
De Iturbide goes on: “the two of them and a group of distin-
guished friends, now all departed, created the Asociación Mexicana 
de Cultura and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(ITAM).”50
Baillères declared at the time:
We are going to educate young men so that, in 30 or 40 years, 
they can carry out the transformation from a statist country to a 
liberal capitalist country51.
Luís Montes de Oca was a certified public accountant. He 
played an important role in directing the country’s finances during 
the period of economic reconstruction: President Plutarco Elías 
                                                                                                                           
Raúl Baillères and several board members from the bank. Later on, de Itur-
bide (who had resigned from the bank in 1955) and Baillères were invited to 
work for Banco Comercial Mexicano (Comermex) as CEO and board mem-
ber, respectively. 
48 Baillères, 1994, p. 36.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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Calles appointed him as Auditor General of the Nation in 1924, and 
he remained in the post until 1927, when he was named Minister of 
Public Finance (1927—1932). During the administration of Lázaro
Cárdenas, between 1935 and 1940, he was Director of the Bank of 
Mexico, and he subsequently retired from politics to make a career 
for himself as a private banker. In 1941, he brought together a group 
of businessmen to form Banco Internacional. Montes de Oca was the 
founding partner of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura who had the 
strongest links with Mexican intellectuals, and it was through him 
that the ITM was able to recruit Miguel Palacios Macedo, a lecturer 
at the National School of Economics, to teach History of Economic 
Thought and Economic Theory at the newly founded Institute52. In 
interview, de Iturbide stated:
Within the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, we had the for-
tune to have a man of exceptional intellectual capabilities: don 
Luís Montes de Oca, who had been the Minister of Finance 
and Director of the Bank of Mexico. At the time he was retired 
from politics. He was an extraordinarily cultured man, and one 
with good relations with other talented men. He was the vehi-
cle that allowed us to contact and attract to the ITM people... 
who were very influential, such as Miguel Palacios Macedo, 
the most important person in the development of the School of 
Economics53.
Carlos Novoa was a private banker who also held a series of 
top-level positions: President of the National Banking Commission, 
1933; President of the Association of Mexican Bankers, 1945—
1946; and Director of the Bank of Mexico from 1946 to 1952. Carlos 
Novoa was the son of Eduardo Novoa, who was Porfirio Díaz’s 
Deputy Justice Minister. His career, like that of Montes de Oca, was 
in public and private finance. At the same time that he held a promi-
                                                          
52 Negrete, 1988, p. 10.
53 Ibid.
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nent government position, he was providing support for a project that 
was at cross purposes with the prevailing economic policy54
Scholar Nora Hamilton maintains that the post-revolutionary 
government, as well as creating the conditions for the accumulation 
of capital, forged a new political class. Once the armed struggle was
.
over, revolutionary generals continued to control several regions 
within the country. The government appeased and controlled these 
military men by providing them with financial dispensations and
channelling their political ambitions into business activities. Hamil-
ton asserts that a classic example of this process was Aarón Sáenz55.
At 26 he was the head of General Álvaro Obregón’s presidential 
guard, the Estado Mayor Presidencial, and he maintained a close 
friendship with the President; in 1924, Obregón appointed him Min-
ister for Foreign Relations; from 1927 to 1930, he was governor of
his home state, Nuevo León56
Comercio
; and he was Minister for Industry and 
Trade from 1930 to 1931. Aarón Sáenz then went from his role in the 
military and in the government to being a businessman. He became a 
sugar magnate, who made a fortune on the strength of the political 
connections he had acquired during the Revolution and then in the 
public offices he held. Sáenz had close links to conservative business 
groups in Monterrey, and he was also president of Banco Azucarero, 
a bank that specialised in investments in the sugar industry, which 
would later become Banco de Industria y
57. He was one of the main founding partners of Banco 
Internacional, together with Montes de Oca:
Sáenz’s wealth apparently originated during his government ca-
reer with the establishment of a construction firm (in association 
with President Calles) which benefited from government con-
tracts. He and Calles,...were also associated in the construction 
of a major
                                                          
54 Camp, 1992, pp. 410-411.
55 Hamilton, 1982, pp. 40-41.
56 See also: Tapia Fabián, ÁaronSaénz. http://www.sre.gob.mx/acervo
/can2_3.pdf.
57 Hamilton, 1982, pp. 40-41.
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sugar refinery at El Mante, in the state of Tamaulipas. Sáenz, 
Calles and other government officials obtained the lands after a 
dam and irrigation system had been constructed at government 
expense, and a modern sugar refinery was built with the assis-
tance of a substantial loan from the Banco de México58.
Another important member of the Association was Aníbal de 
Iturbide, Director of Banco Nacional de México in 1945 and of 
Banco Comercial Mexicano in 1955. For two terms, he was president 
of the Association of Mexican Bankers. He was a key figure in the 
creation of the liberal school of thought, and was one of the most 
prominent bankers of the twentieth century in Mexico. He was pro-
fessional, efficient and competent, and he did not just have a tech-
nical interest in banking; he was also knowledgeable about the mone-
tary and banking theory of the time, and played an active role in
building up the country’s banking and credit institutions. He stood 
out as a leader and intellectual guide in the sector. He participated in 
economic debate, and tried to influence the government’s
‘developmentalist’ economic policy by insisting on stability as a pre-
requisite for development59
Aníbal de Iturbide was a man that expressed and made public 
his ideas and opinions in a range of different documents. Several of 
his works are anthologised in the book Visión científica y 
retrospectiva
. He was particularly active in debates on 
credit and currency.
del crédito en México. In April of 1954, at the XX Bankers’ Conven-
tion held in Acapulco, Guerrero, he gave a talk entitled “The Real 
Importance of Public Spending for the Economy”60
                                                          
58 Ibid., p, 41.
. One work in 
59 See: Visión Crítica Retrospectiva del Crédito en México published in 
1963, volume 11 of the SELA Collection (Selección de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos), which contains several works by Aníbal de Iturbide 
from the period between 1947 and 1960. 
60 “La importancia real del gasto público en la economía”, talk given by 
Aníbal de Iturbide, General Manager of Banco de Comercio S.A. at the XX 
Bankers’ Convention held in Acapulco, Guerrero, on 26th April 1954. 
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particular that summarises his thoughts on currency and credit was 
the conference “Monetary and Credit Policy”, which he presented in 
his capacity as Director of the Bank of Mexico at the Instituto
Tecnológico de México in April of 195961
At this conference, he maintains that the country’s fundamen-
tal problems are dependent on monetary stability, and he goes on to 
add:
.
Thus the need to re-examine our monetary policy and practice 
is a task that must be carried out without delay. The lack of 
stability in the value of our peso is today the most urgent prob-
lem, and the one with the most wide-ranging consequences, for 
the wellbeing of our nation; for this reason, I firmly believe 
that all other aims of economic policy should immediately be 
subordinated to the fundamental objective of keeping our cur-
rency stable62.
In his speech, de Iturbide also took the Mexican monetary and 
banking authorities to task over the role of the Bank of Mexico, as a 
central bank whose job it was to promote economic development in
the country, and railed against the use of the public deficit as an in-
strument for development63
                                                          
61 The conference was held on Wednesday 15th April 1959 in the auditori-
um of the Instituto Tecnológico de México, with Ernesto Fernández 
Hurtado, Deputy Director of the Bank of Mexico, Josué Sáenz and Víctor L. 
Urquidi as speakers. See: Iturbide, Política, 1959. 
.
62 Iturbide, 1959, p. 2.
63 Aníbal de Iturbide held a wide range of positions throughout his career: 
General Manager of Banco de Comercio, S.A.; Chief Executive Officer of 
Banco Comercial Mexicano S.A. (1956); board member of the Asociación 
de Banqueros de México; board member of Tubos de Acero de México;
board member of the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce; 
board member of 24 separate banks affiliated to Banco de Comercio, S.A.; 
board member of La Comercial, Compañía de Seguros, S.A.; board member 
of La Almacenadora, S.A.; board member of Nacional de Drogas, S.A.; 
board member of Manantial Peñafiel; and alternate board member of 
Crédito Hipotecario S.A. He was also the Mexican delegate at the Interna-
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8. The Austrian School in Mexico: Von Mises and Von Hayek
 
In the same year of 1946, a few months after the creation of 
the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, this Association and the Bank-
ers’ Association extended an invitation to Mexico to two of the 
foremost representatives of the Austrian School: the teacher and his 
pupil, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. They were both 
tireless fighters for economic and political freedom, who opposed 
fascism as much as they did socialism or F. D. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. Luis Montes de Oca once again assumed the role of their pro-
moter and presenter at conferences.
9. No Economic Freedom Without Political Liberty
On the 22nd of July 1946, Professor Friedrich von Hayek of 
the London School of Economics arrived in Mexico City, at the invi-
tation of the Association of Mexican Bankers and the Asociación 
Mexicana de Cultura. Hayek was an eminent disciple of Ludwig von 
Mises and author of the famous book published in 1944 The Road to 
Serfdom, in which he argued in favour of the free market and upheld 
the notion that a planned economy can never have enough infor-
mation about individual preferences to allow the consumer to make 
an appropriate choice.
He gave three conferences at the Mexican Institute of Eco-
nomics and the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce on the 
24th, 25th and 29th of July64
                                                                                                                           
tional Credit Conference in Rome; a member of the Commission for Re-
view of the Credit Institutions Law; a member of the Economic and Fiscal 
Policy Council; and a member of the National Commission on the Economy 
organized by President Ávila Camacho during his final year of government. 
See: Romero, Aníbal de Iturbide, 2010, p. 157-162. 
. The first two, on the 24th and 25th, 
64 Doctor Hayek was born in Vienna on the 8th of May 1899 and studied at 
the university in that city, where he obtained a doctorate in law in 1922 and 
another in political science in 1923. He worked in the Austrian civil service 
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centred on the topic of “Employment and Public Expenditure”; the 
subject of the conference of the 29th was “The Meaning of Competi-
tion”. In the conference at the Chambers of Commerce, Professor 
Hayek also spoke on the subject of “The Political Consequences of 
Economic Planning”. President of Banco Internacional Luís Montes 
de Oca – a self-declared enemy of economic planning and, like Pro-
fessor Hayek65, a supporter of neo-liberalism – presented the 
speaker to the audience. At the time, the president of the Bankers’ 
Association was Carlos Novoa66. The magazine El Tiempo reported 
that the mere mention of Hayek’s arrival in Mexico aroused the in-
terest and stirred the passions of Mexican economic scholars. The 
most notable thing about the article, however, was the first appear-
ance in the press of the term “neoliberal”; previously, visiting profes-
sors had been labelled as members of the Austrian School or the 
School of Vienna. In his final conference, Hayek expounded on one 
of his principal theses:
…that political freedom is not possible without economic 
freedom, and that any planning or guidance of the economic 
activities of a country implies the guidance of the political ac-
tivities of its citizens. He declared himself a supporter of a sys-
                                                                                                                           
from 1921 to 1926, and between 1927 and 1931 he was the Director of the 
Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research. From 1929 to 1931 he was 
also a professor in political economics at the University of Vienna. In 1931
he was appointed professor of economic sciences and statistics at London 
University. He was a member of the British Academy and of the Royal 
Economic Society Council. Professor Hayek published the following works: 
Prices and Production, 1931; Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, 1933; 
Collectivist Economic Planning, 1935; Monetary Nationalism and Interna-
tional Stability, 1937; Profits, Interest, and Investment, 1939; The Pure 
Theory of Capital, 1941; The Road to Serfdom, 1944. See: El Universal,
17th July 1946. 
65 El Tiempo, 26th July 1946, pp. 45-46.
66 El Universal, 17th July 1946.
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tem of private enterprise that would only allow a certain de-
gree of planning in exceptional cases…67
Like Ludwig von Mises, von Hayek does not stop at an appre-
ciation of the individual as merely an economically rational being, 
the maximising individual; instead, he sees the individual as a politi-
cal being perhaps over and above a subject whose behaviour opti-
mises the economy. This is an essential point that differentiates this 
school of thought from the old liberalism.
In his conferences, addressed to a public made up of bankers, 
he challenged the policy of public works in a period of high inflation 
as, in his opinion, this would accentuate the imbalance between in-
vestments and savings. He stressed that the regulating mechanism in 
the economy was competition, not the State.
Hayek’s views were echoed in the Mexican business world. At 
a conference he gave on Industrial Planning at the National School of 
Economics before Hayek’s arrival in the country, José R. Colín,
President of the Mexican Chamber of Manufacturing Industry, said 
in reference to the Austrian scholar that
…This writer’s thesis has been found time and again in the the-
ses put forward by different employers’ organisations in our
own country, where the Austrian economist’s arguments have 
been repeated68.
Colín’s comment begs the question: Did Montes de Oca intro-
duce Mexico’s business leaders to Hayek’s theories, or were they 
simply theories that were well received by the country’s business
community?
Hayek’s presence in Mexico received a great deal of attention 
from the press. Nonetheless, it would appear that only the professor 
of economic theory at the UNAM’s National School of Economics,
                                                          
67 El Nacional, 1st July 1946
68 Revista de Economía Continental, vol. 1, no. 1, 15th August 1946.
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Francisco Zamora, was prepared to debate his theories and to chal-
lenge the members of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura. In a 
lengthy article published in the newspaper El Universal, Professor 
Zamora says:
It is at once revealing and ironic that the first foreign academic 
invited to visit by the opulent association of bankers and indus-
trialists, to whom is owed the youthful existence of the Instituto 
Mexicano de Economía and who almost plays the role of ideo-
logical
godfather to the latter, is Professor Friedrich von Hayek. Re-
vealing, because the distinguished economist is the most well-
known and crowd-pulling star that economic liberalism has in 
these increasingly trying times; and ironic because among the 
prominent persons who invited him are many, perhaps the ma-
jority, who owe their relatively recently achieved fortunes and 
social standing to the anti-liberal intervention of the Mexican 
State in the economic activity of the nation, thanks to which 
monopolies have been created that have made them rich.
Thus we find ourselves faced with an amusing paradox: Profes-
sor Hayek has come to Mexico to nurture the seed of the liberal 
economy, after having undertaken a similar mission with great 
success among the North American mesocracy, on the initiative 
and at the cost of a group of moneyed individuals whose wealth, 
in a great number of cases – it could be said in most cases – has 
its origins in government policy that is the polar opposite of the 
principles of liberalism. The patrons of this crusade against 
State intervention in the orientation and development of private 
enterprise without doubt have a wide range of backgrounds; but 
the fact that at least some of them have arrived at this point 
from the sectors of government finance, the sugar industry and 
the road haulage industry gives one justification to doubt the 
sincerity with which they are sponsoring this more or less scien-
tific, liberal-economic propaganda exercise69.
                                                          
69 Zamora, 1946.
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Professor Zamora was referring specifically to the business-
man Aarón Sáenz, who, as we have already mentioned, was a found-
ing partner of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, a sugar-industry 
mogul and a person who had made his fortune under the protection 
of the ‘developmentalist’ State that he so harshly criticised.
10. Von Mises Returns
In August of 1946, Mises visited Mexico for a second time 
and joined Hayek. They travelled together to Lake Chapala in the 
state of Jalisco. In Guadalajara, Mises presented a conference and, 
once again, Montes de Oca was his translator. During his stay in 
Mexico City, Mises gave a series of talks that had been convened by 
Raúl Baillères, the president of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura, 
and by the president of the Bankers’ Association, Carlos Novoa. The 
subject of the first conference, held in the auditorium of the Instituto 
Mexicano de Economía, was “Interventionism; Ideological Founda-
tions and Economic Consequences”70. The second conference, “The 
Crisis of Interventionism”, was held at the same venue on the 14th of 
August71
Hours before giving the last of these talks, Von Mises met 
with members of the Mexico City Rotary Club at an elegant restau-
rant. He told the select group of financiers that he had been a mem-
ber of the Vienna Rotary Club from 1929 to 1938, until Hitler dis-
banded Rotary Clubs in Austria, then in Germany the following year 
and subsequently in all the countries invaded by the Reich. On this
occasion his speech was on price control
.
72
                                                          
70 The Instituto Mexicano de Economía was located at Palma Norte 518, on 
the 6th floor. The conferences were held on the7th and 14th of August 
1946, at 7 p.m. El Universal, 7th August 1946. 
. The essential ideas that 
he put forward in both conferences referred to the obstacles or incen-
71 El Universal, 8th August 1946.
72 El Universal, 14th August 1946.
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tives for the accumulation of capital in developing countries like 
Mexico:
What these countries need, he said, is industrialisation, and for 
this it is necessary to have foreign capital. Exchange-rate con-
trols (which do not exist in Mexico) and the policy of expro-
priation have prevented this capital from coming from abroad. 
Another method is State investment; but this, commented 
Ludwig Von Mises, is politically dubious... There is no other 
alternative, then, to the formation of capital internally. This 
could be achieved by creating the conditions for a quantitative 
and qualitative increase in production, as well as for an in-
crease in the marginal product of labour.
However the obstacles that hinder the accumulation of capital 
must be removed. Any action taken by the State to encourage 
[the accumulation of capital] is good; any action that deters it 
or makes it impossible is bad. Price controls and wage increas-
es through the trade unions go against this goal...
Price-control policy contains a structural contradiction: gov-
ernments want on the one hand high prices for manufacturers, 
and on the other hand low prices for consumers. These oppos-
ing goals are simply impossible to reconcile. By removing bar-
riers to foreign trade and food imports, lower prices would be 
achieved…73
Mises’s recommendation for the process of accumulating capi-
tal in Mexico was free trade, which implied the mobility of capital 
and goods and the influx of foreign investment.
11. In the Company of Monterrey Businessmen
 
The Centro Bancario de Monterrey invited Von Mises, 
through the Asociación de Banqueros de México, to the city of Mon-
terrey to give some of his talks on economics. This led to a confer-
ence that was held on Tuesday, the 20th of August 194674
                                                          
73 Ibid.
. Mises’s 
74 El Porvenir, Monterrey, 19th August 1946.
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reflections once again centred on government interference and the 
development of private enterprise. He also spoke about the successes 
and failures of the Austrian School in the United States:
The Austrian school of economic thought, explained Professor 
Von Mises, was studied and adapted by many of the econo-
mists in the United States who are advisors to the government. 
However, the start of the war threw the economic structure of 
that great nation into turmoil. In the opinion of Professor Von 
Mises, the country will soon recover from its current economic 
problems75.
In Von Mises’s opinion, economic recovery in the United 
States would have a favourable effect for Mexico, as inflation in 
Mexico was dependent on the neighbouring country to the north. As 
he said to a reporter from the newspaper El Porvenir:
As soon as that great nation improves its economic situation, in-
flation in Mexico will stop.
Mexico did not have the choice to go or not to go down the 
dangerous path of inflation. Price controls in the United States, 
which have now been regulated differently to how they were be-
fore, will soon make American industry surpass itself. This, I 
assure you, is colossal. It is not just the vision of a European 
scientist with regard to the potential of this great American con-
tinent76.
Von Mises takes note of the interrelation that existed between 
the two economies. However, he does not consider Mexico’s eco-
nomic dependence on the United States as something harmful; rather, 
it is an essential part of Mexico’s condition as a backward country.
The following day, the 21st of August, Von Mises continued 
with his talks with groups of business leaders from Monterrey. The 
central topics of this conference were: State interventionism and the
                                                          
75 El Porvenir, Monterrey, 20th August 1946.
76 Ibid.
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price-control system. Nazi Germany and Socialist Russia were the 
historical examples that Von Mises made constant reference to. In 
his opinion, State interventionism had direct effects on the political
system. He says: “It is clear that interventionism on the part of the 
State is self-destructive, because it restricts parliamentarianism, lim-
its the freedom of the press, overlaps with labour interests, and de-
stroys private enterprise and political freedom of thought”77
He went on to talk about the price-control system as one of the 
most detrimental forms of State interventionism:
.
The price-control system, said Von Mises, is one of the most 
flagrant forms of interventionism. The system results from the 
inflation created by governments. Governments should not be 
said to combat inflation, but rather its effects...
Of course what the price-control system results in, once the 
government has failed in its intervention to dictate the eco-
nomic index of a given product, is the farmer or the industrial-
ist that produces the product whose price has been capped by 
the government simply abandoning his crop or his production, 
because the benefit created by the activity decreases. When 
supply goes down but demand remains the same, the value of 
the article increases outside the regulated market, creating one 
fictional price and one black-market price; this leads to infla-
tion because the government is incapable of controlling the 
rise in the price of the article due to demand. The government 
eventually is forced to abandon its price interference and to 
accept the inflation, and must then try to combat inflation after 
the fact78.
Mises also held meetings with several business concerns from 
the region: accompanied by Virgilio Garza Jr., president of Crédito 
Industrial; Ignacio Martínez Jr., manager of Banco de Nuevo León;
Francisco Maldonado, manager of Compañía General de 
Aceptaciones; and Jesús Velasco, manager of Banco de Monterrey, 
he visited several local factories, gave a conference at Banco de 
                                                          
77 El Porvenir, Monterrey, 21st August 1946.
78 Ibid.
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Crédito Industrial, and dined with a group of bankers at the Casino 
de Monterrey. As we can see, Mises and Hayek had a very busy 
schedule on the visit they paid to Mexico’s business community.
12. Mont Pelerin Society in Mexico
On the 10th of April 1947, the Mont Pelerin Society was cre-
ated by a group of mainly economists, historians and philosophers 
from the academic world, under the leadership of Friedrich August 
von Hayek and Albert Hunold79. Among other notables who formed 
the society were Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and the phi-
losopher Karl Popper80
proposed of the State and the fate of classical liberalism. The group 
stated that:
. At its inaugural meeting, a discussion was
Its sole objective was to facilitate an exchange of ideas between 
like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthening the principles 
and practice of a free society and to study the workings, virtues, 
and defects of market-oriented economic systems81.
The society’s members described themselves as liberals, and 
they were opposed to theories that defended State interventionism 
such as those of John Maynard Keynes, which gained currency after
the Second World War.
In the post-War period, those responsible for economic policy 
in various countries took inspiration from Keynesian theory to pur-
sue the development of their respective economies. At the same time,
                                                          
79 The society’s name is taken from the Swiss resort where the group’s first 
meeting was held. See: Harvey, “Breve”, 2007, p. 26. 
80 For the society’s articles of incorporation, see web site: 
http:www.montpelerin.org/aboutmps.html, and Harvey, “Breve”, 2007, p. 
27. 
81 http://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/mpsAbout.html.
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neoliberals opposed the systems of centralised State planning. They 
argued that:
Decisions made by States... were condemned to be politically 
biased on the basis of the interest groups that would be affected 
on each occasion (such as trade unions, environmental organisa-
tions or business lobbying interests). Any decisions made by 
States on investment and the accumulation of capital would al-
ways be erroneous, because the information available to the 
State could not compete with the information contained in the 
market82.
The group held annual meetings in different cities around the 
world, and in September 1958, Mont Pelerin came to Mexico. The 
society’s meeting was sponsored by the Instituto de Investigaciones
Sociales y Económicas, A.C. The attending professors who were 
members of the society were: Bruno Leoni, Ernst Bieri, Bernard 
Pfister, Friedrich von Hayek, Albert Hunold, W. H. Hutt, John Van 
Sickle, Arthur A. Shenfield, Ludwig von Mises and Daniel Villey.
As well as conferences that were given by some of the mem-
bers, a round table discussion was organised on the problems of the 
world economy. The two fundamental topics of the debate were in-
flation and official controls. There were also reflections on:
                                                          
82 The members of the group described themselves as “liberals” (in the tra-
ditional European sense of the word) because of their fundamental com-
mitment to the ideals of individual freedoms. The label “neoliberal” indicat-
ed that they were adherents of the free-market principles established by ne-
oclassical economics, the movement that emerged in the second half of the 
19th century (as a result of the work of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley 
Jevons and Leon Walras) and replaced the classical theories of Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and Carlos Marx. Nonetheless, they stood by Adam
Smith’s conclusion that the invisible hand of the market was the best mech-
anism to mobilise even the basest of human instincts, such as gluttony, 
greed and the desire for wealth and power, for the common good. Harvey, 
“Breve”, 2007, p. 27. 
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…inflationist financial policy... and they warned that controls 
on prices, imports and exports would counteract the efforts of 
private enterprise and necessarily create negative effects on ag-
ricultural and industrial production and on the different business 
sectors; in the long term the economy would be brought down
by a contraction in productive activity. We can only hope that 
these authoritative voices are heard in the spheres of govern-
ment in Mexico, where the controlled economy has powerful 
sympathisers who stubbornly follow an inept policy of making 
the State the master of the land83.
The Mont Pelerin intellectuals failed to achieve broad appeal 
in Mexico because at that time, the socalled “Mexican miracle” was 
at its peak and the Mexican State had adopted a model of develop-
ment that ensured stability, with an economic policy in which State 
intervention played a fundamental role. Nonetheless, there were 
those among the country’s élite who were determined to strengthen 
the liberal programme promoted by the organisation.
13. Epilogue
 
The economic programme of President Cárdenas, based on 
economic growth with the distribution of wealth, was seen in a nega-
tive light by some of Mexico’s business leaders. Bankers and indus-
trialists sought to create institutions that would counteract the 
movement, which was the cornerstone of Mexican 
‘developmentalism’. Within this context, it is easy to grasp the sig-
nificance of the trips made to Mexico by the two most important 
members of the Austrian School – Von Mises and Von Hayek –
whose aim was to provide ideological and theoretical support for the 
debate being waged by the Mexican élite against the nationalist Mex-
ican State. They fulfilled their role of helping to articulate the dis-
                                                          
83 Excélsior, 2nd October 1958.
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course of the group of Mexican businesses most closely linked to the 
international financial sector.
The élite took on the task of creating the conditions for the 
construction of an alternative project to Cardenism, and therefore to 
economic nationalism. The establishment of higher education institu-
tions was the most significant means employed to help realise this 
ideal. An example is the Instituto Tecnológico de México; from the 
time it was founded, both the Institute’s administrators and the mem-
bers of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura began submitting the 
necessary applications to the corresponding authorities to achieve 
full academic independence for the institution. On the 10th of April 
1962, President Adolfo López Mateos signed a decree granting the 
institution its independence84
Things did not stop there. The group of business leaders would 
continue to create institutions throughout the second half of the twen-
tieth century. On the 13th of September 1962, on the initiative of the 
businessman Bruno Bagliani, the Mexican Council of Businessmen 
(CMHN) was founded. The organisation ostensibly had the objective 
of creating a mechanism for arbitration between business, the State 
and civil society
. This gave the institute complete free-
dom to design study plans, programmes and methods of teaching, 
and it became the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(ITAM). The institute became an important source of young people 
with technical expertise as economists and a different way of think-
ing about economics to that which was prevalent in the so-called
‘developmentalist’ stage, who then went on to implement the politi-
cal project conceived by their educators.
85
                                                          
84 The decree was published in the Official Federal Gazette on the 19th of 
January 1963, at a time when the Minister for Public Education was Jaime 
Torres Bodet. Miguel González Avelarand and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo partic-
ipated in drafting the decree. See: Opción, April 1988, p. 44. 
, although banker Aníbal de Iturbide suggests that 
the business group was established with the aim of creating a direct 
channel of communication with the top levels of political power and 
of representing the country’s most important business leaders.
85 Brito, 2002, p. 81.
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Over time, and for the rest of the twentieth century, the de-
mands of the group of business leaders who set about building insti-
tutions to promote liberalism and oppose economic nationalism re-
mained: limitation of participation of the State in the economy, elim-
ination of protectionism, and promotion of free trade and foreign in-
vestment.
To conclude, it is very important to emphasise that although 
the group with liberalist leanings was economically strong, not eve-
ryone in the Mexican business community was opposed to the ideol-
ogy of economic nationalism. In fact, a group of business leaders 
emerged and became strong due to economic protection and the sup-
port of government policies. A detailed study has yet to be carried
out as to what kinds of business interests, and from which sectors, 
were the ones who sought to create a project linked to liberalism dur-
ing the twentieth century in Mexico.
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